

MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ

Operations Update



Maj Gen Rick Lynch

11 May 2006

Operations Summary


★ Mosul
**Operation Cool Springs VIII;
IED Cell Captured**

**Abandoned Train Station;
300 Sons of Al Anbar depart
for IP training**

★ Baghdad
**Operation Scales of
Justice; Operation
United Front**

Weekly Ops
29 Apr – 5 May 06

Combined	ISF-only	CF-only	Total
225/47%	135/28%	120/25%	480



EXPLOSIVES DISCOVERED IN MOSQUE SCHOOL

May 5, 2006

Summary:

At 6:43 p.m. Baghdad firefighters responded to a fire in the Sheik Abdel Kader Mosque school. After the fire was under control the firefighters reported to the 6th Iraqi Army at 7 p.m. that they had found a cache of weapons and explosives in the building.

Assessment/BDA:

- School building was an IED production and staging area
- The fire originated while individuals were preparing IEDs
- Several completed IEDs were staged in vehicles apparently ready to be taken to an emplacement site

- 2 x AIF KIA
- 1 x AIF WIA
- 2 x Guards detained



EXPLOSIVES DISCOVERED IN MOSQUE SCHOOL

May 5, 2006



**CACHE FOUND INSIDE
MOSQUE SCHOOL**



**VEHICLES FOUND
OUTSIDE MOSQUE
SCHOOL WITH IEDS INSIDE
READY TO DEPLOY**

3rd Iraqi Battalion and Coalition Forces Weapons Cache -- May 7, 2006

Where: 10km SW of Baghdad.

Six Weapons Caches found:

- 46 AP mines
- 2 155mm rounds
- 15 RPG rounds
- 4 RPG launchers
- 1 RPG sight
- 6 RPG motors
- 8 AK-47s
- 37 AK magazines
- 8 ammo vests with 7.62mm ammunition
- 1000 7.62mm rounds in a bag
- 3 7.62mm ammo cans
- 100 .45mm rounds
- 2 ammo pouches
- 2 machine gun barrels
- 7 fragmentary grenades
- 1 fuse grenade
- 1 10lb bag of HME, 1 x 1/2 lb of PE4
- 7 artillery boosters, 6 mortar rounds, 4 mortar fuses, 3 bags of mortar fuses
- 7 blasting caps
- 1 spool of det cord, 1 spool of wire
- 3 Sony videos, 1 6V battery, 4 speakers, 1 wire cutter
- 10 License plates
- 4 Sets Iraqi Army DCUs



Capture of Saad Awad Alwan, Tawid Jihad Al Qaeda in Iraq

Leader – 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Divsion

Cell Leader and passenger in vehicle captured.

17 full AK-47 magazines
20 rolls of TNT
3 pistols and 5 magazines
2 belts of 7.62mm 4:1 mix
8 boxes of pistol ammo

Intelligence from capture led to a raid in Adhamiyah 90 minutes later

RESULTS: 5 detainees

Weapons recovered:


- 8 Timer Switches
- 1 Motorola rigged detonator
- 1 82mm mortar tube
- 9V batteries rigged to switches
- 3 pipes for rockets
- 1 82mm mortar tripod
- 1 60mm mortar tripod
- 1 82mm base plate
- 1 rocket, large
- 1 bag of paraphernalia



Pictures of the tubes found pointed out the window towards Khadimiyah



Picture of switches/detonators.



Al Qaeda in Iraq's Baghdad Strategy

Strategic outline, notes, and comments for operations in Baghdad

Outline

Operations based on ethnic makeup of district/area

States that the Shi'a are the priority target in Baghdad

Directs the reduction of attacks in predominately Sunni areas

Directs the elimination of spies and informants in the Sunni area

Shi'a

Remove Shi'a from mixed neighborhoods calmly and without fanfare

Conduct operations in order to isolate Shi'a areas, forcing them to move

Tactics

Displace/reduce ops against CF in order to operate against them in Baghdad

Concentrate on static patrols through the use of snipers

Conduct (IED) attacks along major LOCs outside of Sunni areas

Strategy

Freedom of movement in Baghdad is the key

- **Striking fixed detachments**
- **Striking dispatch centers**

Maintaining the "Belt"

Inciting the people against the Shi'a

Baghdad State of Affairs – AMZ Reality

INSIDER'S CRITIQUE OF BAGHDAD

Strategy Lacking: *“No clear or comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center”*

- Media oriented policy attracts us to “noisy operations”
- Most detachments are unorganized assassination squads lacking military capabilities
- Disorganized at local / detachment so-called Emir level, lacking coordination
- VBIED activity does not constitute beneficial mid- to long-range plan

Tactics Problematic: *“Mujahidin are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government”*

- Actions limited to sniping at patrols far from their base, hunting strayed vehicles, using civilians as cover, planting IEDs in residential areas to strike US / govt officials

Leadership Issues:

- Mil Emir of Baghdad is brave but lacking experience / clear vision / current solutions
- North Baghdad leader suffering from movement restrictions, poor security situation ...
-- *“remove him from Baghdad to a location where he can work easier; otherwise he is closer to become totally ineffective”*

Sunni Participation in National Guard Posing Dilemma:

- People talking about it, MUC & IIP supportive ... opposition may align Sunnis against us
- *“We should not allow this situation to exist at all”*

Media Frustrations:

- US investment in IIP and MUC successful ... “numbing” the Sunnis
- *“Our weak media which is confined mainly to the internet”*

Small numbers of mujahidin: *“How can we increase these numbers.”*

Abu Abd al Rahman Captured

Al Qaeda in Iraq Emir of the Tigris River Valley



**Abu Abd al Rahman
aka Abu Husayn & Abu Faris**


“Emir of the Tigris River Valley”

- **Responsible for a network that facilitates foreign fighters through the Tigris River Valley.**
- **Network smuggles weapons from Syria and Lebanon through the TRV. Allegedly expecting a shipment of MANPADs and an armored vehicle prior to his detainment.**
- **Conducted attacks against Coalition and Iraqi Forces as well as local infrastructure. His network allegedly provided security for a local electrical plant and conducted attacks against the site to ensure job security.**
- **Detainment will temporarily disrupt foreign fighter facilitation in the Lake Thar Thar/Samarra area. It will also impact operations and comms amongst remaining cell members in the TRV**

Ali Wali killed in Baghdad raid


Ansar al Sunna explosives/chemical expert

- **Ansar al Sunna explosives/chemical expert, operational planner and trainer. Veteran terrorist who trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s.**
- **Returned to Iraq and assumed a leadership role providing training in ambushes, suicide missions, and kidnappings.**
- **Openly criticized AMZ for poor planning skills and a lack of preparation for battle -- placed the blame for the 2004 loss of Fallujah as a safe haven solely on AMZ.**
- **Although Ali Wali disagreed with AMZ tactically, he was also attempting to pursue Al Qaeda's strategic goal to establish an Islamic Caliphate.**



Ali Wali
aka Abbas bin Farna bin Qafqas

Total Tips



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